Talk:Special Naval Landing Forces

Dubious assertions

I've flagged a couple of questionable assertions in the article.

First, according to Evans and Peattie (1976), Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941, page 443, the SNLF were organized in response to the events at Shanghai in 1932. Thus the SNLF could not have participated in those events, having not yet been organized. However, this is a passing mention in a very thick book, so I'll pause to see if anyone has a more specific source before removing the assertion.

The Shanghai Naval Brigade (actually a small battalion) was not an SNFL unit. It was an ad hoc organization drawn from various sources within the IJN. As such, it was merely an extension of the tradition of drawing temporary landing forces from one or more ships for temporary operations ashore. The formerly organized SNLF units began to appear in early 1941.Oldbubblehead (talk) 10:31, 1 February 2016 (UTC)

Second, the article attributes the Manila Massacre to the SNLF. My sources blame it on 31 Base Force, which may have had an SNLF or former SNLF component, but was not an SNLF formation. Again, waiting to see if anyone can shed further light on this before removing the claim. --Yaush (talk) 20:06, 7 August 2013 (UTC)

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This is correct regarding Manila. There was 31st Special Base Force which likely had SNLF members; the bulk was from a naval guard unit. And the 10,000 number was for all the disparate naval units in the Manila Defense Force. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.123.227.130 (talk) 08:29, 29 April 2015 (UTC)

Okay, I've removed the Manila Massacre statement; it seems clear that, at most, some SNLF troops were part of the force. I'm leaving the Shanghai statement for now; I have some better sources available now and (now that this has come back to my attention) I can try to fix it later on. --Yaush (talk) 16:32, 29 April 2015 (UTC)

According to a SWPA intelligence document on the Japanese Naval forces involved in the Battle of Manila, there were no SNLF units present. By 1944/5 there wasn't much to distinguish a member of the SNLF from any other IJN sailor with a rifle.Oldbubblehead (talk) 10:31, 1 February 2016 (UTC)

Irrelevant Sections

The section on uniform, along with the picture of General Yamashita (an IJA officer) mostly concerns that of the Army, not the SNLF. It should be removed or heavily edited. 71.226.42.108 (talk) 19:33, 8 September 2013 (UTC)

I agree there are any number of public domain photos of Japanese naval officers which would be appropriate. Check NARA's online catalog.Oldbubblehead (talk) 10:31, 1 February 2016 (UTC)

Modern Equivalent

Obviously the forces no longer exist with the dissolution of the Japanese Navy, but isn't there an equivalent force in the current JMSDF? I understand that as a purely defensive force, the JMSDF has no need (and is explicitly barred from) having a large marine corp, but even from a defensive standpoint, every maritime force needs some land-based fighting capability. The closest I could find are the boarding forces, but they are technically special forces, not marines. Anyone know what the Modern day equivalent is?

There is nothing in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution which explicitly bars Japan from having a marine corps. The constitution does however state that Japan will not maintain "offensive forces" of which a marine corps might be considered a part. However, from what I understand the Ground Self Defense force has conducted some amphibious training with both the JMSDF and the USMC. Japan does not have any dedicated ground units with an amphibious mission in either the JMSDF or the JGSDF.Oldbubblehead (talk) 10:02, 1 February 2016 (UTC)

Guard Detachments and Armor Units

The "guard detachments" (of which there were many, many more than listed here) and the armor units were not part of the tokubetsu rikusentai and should be removed from the article. Additionally, the schools listed were not dedicated SNLF schools. Also, the list of actual SLNF units is far from complete.[sources (among others): CINCPAC-CINCPOA Special Bulletin on IJN Ground Forces and MID's Preliminary Report of the Final Japanese Order of Battle Conference].Oldbubblehead (talk) 09:56, 1 February 2016 (UTC)

“Naval Infantry” versus “Marines”

This article describes the SNLF as “naval infantry” (in the introduction, at least) while the NLF are described as “marines.”

Unless I’m very much mistaken, it would seem that the NLF was simply ad-hoc units of naval personnel put-together for offensive or defensive operations as-necessary. Whereas the SNLF was a more permanent force of professional infantry.

The SNLF article even specifies (in the “History” section):

”Since the late Meiji Era, the IJN had naval landing forces or rikusentai formed from individual ships's crews, who received infantry training as part of their basic training, for special and/or temporary missions. In addition, troops from Naval Bases known as Kaiheidancould form a naval landing force.”

To me, this would indicate that the NLF would be more appropriately described as “naval infantry” with the SNLF being the more permanent and professional “marines.”

My contention is thus; While there are naval infantry units whose permanent primary task is indeed infantry operations (typically units explicitly titled as “naval infantry,” such as the Russian Naval Infantry) it also describes ad-hoc units of non-infantry naval personnel employed temporarily or semi-permanently as infantrymen. Whereas “marines” are personnel that have explicitly (if not exclusively) received infantry training and whose units are raised to take advantage of this and on a more permanent basis.

I’ve also posted this to the NLF’s talk page.

Thoughts?

MWFwiki (talk) 05:41, 27 May 2024 (UTC)